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Stefano Barbieri
Stefano Barbieri
Economics Department, Tulane University
Verified email at tulane.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
S Barbieri, DA Malueg, I Topolyan
Economic Theory 57, 603-640, 2014
542014
The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information
S Barbieri, DA Malueg, I Topolyan
Economic Theory 57, 603-640, 2014
542014
Private provision of a discrete public good: Efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Economic Theory 37, 51-80, 2008
422008
Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Journal of Public Economics 94 (11-12), 848-861, 2010
332010
Private provision of a discrete public good: Continuous‐strategy equilibria in the private‐information subscription game
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Journal of Public Economic Theory 10 (4), 529-545, 2008
302008
Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Games and Economic Behavior 98, 219-234, 2016
272016
Winners' Efforts in Multi-Battle Team Contests
S Barbieri, M Serena
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2019
212019
Communication and early contributions
S Barbieri
Journal of Public Economic Theory 14 (3), 391-421, 2012
182012
Group efforts when performance is determined by the “best shot”
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Economic Theory 56, 333-373, 2014
172014
Private information in the BBV model of public goods
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Journal of Public Economic Theory 18 (6), 857-881, 2016
152016
Increasing fundraising success by decreasing donor choice
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Journal of Public Economic Theory 16 (3), 372-400, 2014
142014
Increasing fundraising success by decreasing donor choice
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Journal of Public Economic Theory 16 (3), 372-400, 2014
142014
Profit-maximizing sale of a discrete public good via the subscription game in private-information environments
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 0000102202193517041575, 2010
142010
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
S Barbieri, M Serena
Games and Economic Behavior 136, 1-30, 2022
132022
Membership in citizen groups
S Barbieri, A Mattozzi
Games and Economic Behavior 67 (1), 217-232, 2009
13*2009
On the voluntary provision of “weakest‐link” public goods: The case of private information
S Barbieri, DA Malueg
Journal of Public Economic Theory 21 (5), 866-894, 2019
122019
Membership in citizen groups
S Barbieri, A Mattozzi
Games and Economic Behavior 67 (1), 217-232, 2009
112009
Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”
S Barbieri, D Kovenock, DA Malueg, I Topolyan
Games and Economic Behavior 118, 382-411, 2019
92019
Biasing unbiased dynamic contests
S Barbieri, M Serena
SSRN, 2018
92018
Middle-class flight from post-Katrina New Orleans: A theoretical analysis of inequality and schooling
S Barbieri, JHY Edwards
Regional Science and Urban Economics 64, 12-29, 2017
82017
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