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Giuseppe Lopomo
Giuseppe Lopomo
Professor of Business Administration, Duke University
Verified email at duke.edu
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects, with and without complementarities
S Brusco, G Lopomo
The Review of Economic Studies 69 (2), 407-436, 2002
1902002
Uncertainty in mechanism design
G Lopomo, L Rigotti, C Shannon
arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.12633, 2021
802021
Strategic commitments and the principle of reciprocity in interconnection pricing
N Economides, G Lopomo, G Woroch
The economics of digital markets, 62-99, 2009
742009
Carbon allowance auction design: an assessment of options for the United States
G Lopomo, LM Marx, D McAdams, B Murray
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2011
642011
Regulatory pricing rules to neutralize network dominance
N Economides, G Lopomo, G Woroch
Industrial and Corporate Change 5 (4), 1013-1028, 1996
631996
Optimality and robustness of the English auction
G Lopomo
Games and Economic Behavior 36 (2), 219-240, 2001
622001
Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
G Lopomo, L Rigotti, C Shannon
Journal of Economic Theory 146 (3), 1148-1172, 2011
582011
Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
S Brusco, G Lopomo
Economic Theory 38, 105-124, 2009
572009
Bargaining, interdependence, and the rationality of fair division
G Lopomo, EA Ok
RAND Journal of Economics, 263-283, 2001
572001
Efficient mechanisms for mergers and acquisitions
S Brusco, G Lopomo, DT Robinson, S Viswanathan
International Economic Review 48 (3), 995-1035, 2007
542007
The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
G Lopomo
Journal of Economic Theory 82 (1), 144-166, 1998
541998
Delegating management to experts
C Dai, TR Lewis, G Lopomo
The Rand Journal of Economics 37 (3), 503-520, 2006
532006
Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
G Lopomo, LM Marx, P Sun
Review of Economic Design 15 (3), 177-211, 2011
432011
Collusion via signalling in open ascending auctions with multiple objects and complementarities
S Brusco, G Lopomo
NYU Working Paper No. EC-99-05, 1999
361999
Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data
JJ Anton, S Brusco, G Lopomo
Games and Economic Behavior 69 (1), 24-41, 2010
352010
Inefficiency of collusion at english auctions
G Lopomo, RC Marshall, LM Marx
The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 5 (1), 0000102202153459711156, 2005
352005
Stairway to heaven or highway to hell: Liquidity, sweat equity, and the uncertain path to ownership
RV Krishna, G Lopomo, CR Taylor
The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (1), 104-127, 2013
332013
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING‐BID AUCTIONS*
S Brusco, G Lopomo
The Journal of Industrial Economics 56 (1), 113-142, 2008
332008
Uncertainty in mechanism design
G Lopomo, L Rigotti, C Shannon
Unpublished paper, University of Pittsburgh.[975], 2014
292014
Resource allocation under demand uncertainty and private information
A Belloni, G Lopomo, S Wang
Management Science 63 (12), 4219-4235, 2017
212017
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